Judge Nicole Gaines Phelps 1 ŒFJÍÖÒÔÆÎ¢ÆŢÞŒŒĀŢĠay, January 3, 2020 at 11:00 a.m. 2 SOÞ ŐÁÔU WÞVŸ ÙWÚÒÜQJÜÁÔUWÜVÁÔŠÒÜS 3 ÒËZ(ŠÒÖ Vďækji iЀægilækkóúroÔ 4 5 6 IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 7 IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF KING 8 9 LARGO WALES, a married woman, No. 19-2-20274-2 KNT 10 Plaintiff. DEFENDANTS CITY OF AUBURN, 11 v. ROB ROSCOE AND MAYOR 12 CITY OF AUBURN, WA, a Washington, NANCY BACKUS' REPLY RE: State municipality; NANCY BACKUS, as CR 12(b)(6) MOTION TO DISMISS 13 Mayor of the City of Auburn, and PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT Individually and her marital community; 14 and The Committee to Elect Nancy Backus and 15 its J. Doe committee members thereto; and ROB ROSCOE and his marital 16 community, 17 Defendants. 18 I. **REPLY** 19 Rather than address unassailable legal authority cited by Defendants, Plaintiff 20 appears to express disbelief regarding the state of the law in Washington, despite a plethora 21 of legal authority specifically establishing that she cannot pursue civil claims based on 22 alleged violations of the Washington State Constitution. However, ignorance of the law does 23 is not cause to ignore it. The court should enter an order dismissing Plaintiff's Complaint. 24 Plaintiff Still Fails to State a Claim on Which Any Relief Can be Granted and Α. 25 Thus Her Complaint Should Be Dismissed as a Matter of Law Pursuant to CR 12(b)(6). 26 Plaintiff fails to even acknowledge, must less respond to, well-established 27

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Washington barring private civil claims based on the State constitution. *See, Blinka v. Wash. State Bar Ass'n*, 109 Wn.App. 575, 591, 36 P.3d 1094 (2001), *rev. den.* 146 Wn.2d 1021 (2002). *Sys. Amuse., Inc. v. State*, 7 Wn.App. 516, 517, 500 P.2d 1253 (1972); *Spurrell v. Bloch*, 40 Wn.App. 854, 860–61, 701 P.2d 529 (1985); *Reid v. Pierce County*, 136 Wash.2d 195, 961 P.2d 333 (1998). This is the "common law" of the State as established by Washington appellate jurisprudence. Plaintiff's statement in her response brief that "the remedy flows from the common law underneath, and incorporated into, the Washington State Constitution" (p. 3, 1l. 28-29) is simply wrong.

Contrary to Plaintiff's argument suggestion that precluding civil claims eviscerates the individual rights protected by the Washington Constitution, the teeth are sharpened by authorizing courts to void government conduct that violates such rights. *See*, *Systems Amuse., Inc. v. State*, 7 Wn.App. 516, 517, 500 P.2d 1253 (1972) (while acts that violate constitutional protection may be declared void by the courts, the state constitution does not provide a private cause of action). In *Systems Amusement*, the court specifically declined to create a new cause of action based on an alleged violation of the State Constitution. Sixteen years later, the Washington Supreme Court similarly refused to create a private right of action based on violation of privacy rights established under Art. 1 §7. *Reid v. Pierce Cty.*, 136 Wn.2d 195, 961 P.3d 333 (1998)(dismissing constitutional claims pursuant to CR 12(b)(6).

This is why most Washington caselaw citing the State Constitution—including most cases cited by Plaintiff-- arises in the criminal context. *See, e.g. State v. Afana,* 169 Wn.2d 169, 233 P.3d 879 (2010) (excluding evidence obtained during warrantless search of car that did not meet the more restrictive privacy standards under the Washington Constitution during criminal trial); *State v. Arreola, 176 Wn.2d 284, 290 P.3d 983 (2012)(and cases cited in excerpt)* (describing higher level of restriction on warrantless searches and seizures by law enforcement under Art. I, §7 of the Washington Constitution than under the Federal Fourth

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Amendment for purposes of determining exclusion of evidence in criminal cases). None of these cases in any way suggest that a private right of action for damages follows upon establishing a violation of the State Constitution.<sup>1</sup>

Like the United States Constitution, the Washington Constitution simply does not establish a cognizable cause of action for enforcement of rights protected "without the aid of augmentive legislation." *Blinka v. Wash. State Bar Ass'n*, 109 Wn. App. 575, 591, 36 P.3d 1094, 1102 (2001). While 42 U.S.C §1983 provides a vehicle for a certain scope of civil claims against certain parties to remedy Constitutional rights under the Federal Constitution, the Washington legislature has never adopted such parallel legislation at the State level.

## B. Plaintiff's Failure to State An Actionable Claim is Not Simply a Matter of Inartful "Notice" Pleading.

Here, Plaintiff has filed three different Complaints in this action thus far. Under the standards applied in a CR 12(b)(6) motion, the court should assume—for purposes of this motion only—that all factual allegations in Plaintiff's Complaint are true. The question here is whether she has stated an actionable, substantive *legal* claim.<sup>2</sup> Despite filing three Complaints and a substantive response to Defendants' Motions to Dismiss, plaintiff still fails to identify one.

Champagne v. Thurston Cty., 163 Wn.2d 69, 85, 178 P.3d 936 (2008), cited by Plaintiff, is distinguishable. There, the Defendant has argued that Plaintiffs had not clearly articulated the basis of their claims because they had not specified the nature of remedy sought pursuant to each legal theory. However, the court ruled that the Plaintiffs had provided sufficient notice of its intent to pursue claims pursuant to the terms of three different wage loss statutes by specifically referencing the statutes in the Complaint. Here,

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Indeed, if it did, there would no doubt be a corresponding civil lawsuit following each and every one of the criminal cases in which the courts found a violation of the State Constitution resulting from a warrantless arrest or other law enforcement conduct.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>2</sup> A complaint may be lacking for one of two reasons: (i) absence of a cognizable legal theory, or (ii) insufficient facts under a cognizable legal claim. *Robertson v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.*, 749 F.2d 530, 534 (9th Cir. 1984).

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Plaintiff is not pursuing claims based on statutes or legal theories other than alleged violation of "rights" and "duties" established by the terms of the Washington State Constitution.

Plaintiff's first Complaint was titled "Complaint for damages violation of freedom of speech, right to privacy;" the Complaint failed to cite to any substantive source of law under which she was pursuing claims but included language asserting Defendants acted "under color of law" and violated Plaintiff's "right to exercise free speech" and "right to privacy"—language indicative of state and federal constitutional standards. *See, Complaint filed August* 1, 2019.

Plaintiff then amended her Complaint on September 12, 2019, adding references to alleged violations of her "United States First Amendment right to free speech," and "expectation of privacy" "as enunciated by the Washington State Constitution." *See, Amended Complaint*, p. 2 ¶1 and p. 3, ¶1. A week later, Plaintiff further amended her Complaint, deleting references to the Federal Constitution and specifying that her claims were based on Article 1, Sections 5 and 7 of the Washington State Constitution—rights to free speech and privacy. *See, Second Amended Complaint*, p. 2 §1 and p. 3 §1-2.<sup>3</sup>

Plaintiff clearly, intentionally, and expressly limited the causes of action she is pursuing to claims based solely on Art. 1 §7 of the Washington Constitution. No statutory claims. No Federal claims. No tort claims. In fact, if Plaintiff's Complaint had plead any tort claims against the municipal Defendants here, additional defenses would bar such claims, including failure to file a tort claim and statutes of limitations. No such claims were plead, however, after filing three versions of the Complaint, and thus there has not been a basis for raising such claims. Plaintiff's failure to file a tort claim or affirmatively plead that she complied with the pre-filing tort claim requirements of RCW 4.96.020 (requiring filing of

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<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> On October 23, 2019, Defendants served Plaintiff with notice of the hearing on Defendants Motion to Dismiss on December 6, 2019, the first date the court had available. Subsequently, the motion was re-noted on January 3, 2020 at Plaintiff's request.

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tort claim as condition precedent to pursuing a tort claim against a local government entity) further evidences her intent to pursue only claims based on the Washington State Constitution as plead in her Complaints.

There is nothing unclear about the remedies Plaintiff seeks; each version of her Complaint specifies she is seeking damages and attorney fees. Even in her response, she reiterates that she is pursuing damages claims base on "rights enumerated in the Washington State Constitution." Defendants promptly moved for dismissal of these claims pursuant to CR 12(b)(6) instead of first filing an Answer as allowed by CR 12(b).<sup>4</sup>

## II. <u>CONCLUSION</u>

Based on the foregoing, the court should enter an order dismissing Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint and all claims and causes of action therein as a matter of law.

I certify that this memorandum contains 1,326 words, in compliance with the Local Civil Rules.

DATED: December 6, 2019

KEATING, BUCKLIN & McCORMACK, INC., P.S.

By: /s/ Jayne L. Freeman

Jayne L. Freeman, WSBA #24318 Attorney for Defendants City of Auburn, Rob Roscoe, and Nancy Backus, in Her Official Capacity as Mayor of City of Auburn

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<sup>4</sup> If Federal claims had been included in the Complaint, Defendants would also have the option of removing the matter to Federal court.

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## DECLARATION OF SERVICE 1 I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of Washington that on 2 December 6, 2019, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS CITY OF 3 AUBURN, ROB ROSCOE AND MAYOR NANCY BACKUS' REPLY RE: CR 12(b)(6) 4 MOTION TO DISMISS PLAINTIFF'S COMPLAINT was served upon the parties listed 5 below via the King County Superior Court Efiling system and courtesy email: 6 **Attorney for Plaintiff** 7 John Max Torres Jr., WSBA #26287 8 AUBURN LAW OFFICES PLLC 9 220 1st Street NE Auburn, WA 98002-5052 Phone: (253) 288-8015 10 Fax: (253) 288-8016 Email: main@auburnlawoffices.com 11 12 Attorney for Defendant Nancy Backus, in Her Individual Capacity 13 Scott Wakefield, WSBA #11222 14 WAKEFIELD & KIRKPATRICK, PLLC 17544 Midvale Avenue North, Suite 307 15 Shoreline, WA 98133 phone: (206) 629-5489 16 fax: (206) 629-2120 Email: swakefield@wakefieldkirkpatrick.com 17 esolbrig@wakefieldkirkpatrick.com 18 DATED this 6<sup>th</sup> day of December, 2019, at Seattle, Washington. 19 20 21

/s/ LaHoma Walker LaHoma Walker, Legal Assistant

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